Longshore Act at SCOTUS - Transcript Available - Roberts v. Sea-land Services

Last week, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the Roberts v. Sea-Land Services case.  The transcript of oral arguments is here. 

The issue in this case is when an injured longshore worker's "Average Weekly Wage" is to be determined:  at the time of the entitlement to an award of compensation or the actual award of compensation.

The oral arguments required the justices to wade deep into a dense statutory worker compensation regime and address what appears to be an omission in the statute.  Justice Scalia was unimpressed with Congress' statute-writing ability, asking the counsel if this was a "stupid statute."

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 The Question Presented is:

The Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (“Longshore Act”), provides generally for compensation for total disability in periodic payments at a rate of two-thirds of the “average weekly wage of the injured employee at the time of the injury,” and for most partial disabilities the same fraction of the difference between that weekly wage and the worker’s residual “wage-earning capacity.” Id. §§ 8, 10, 33 U.S.C. §§ 908, 910. But it has always imposed upper and lower limits on the rate payable as so determined. Section 6(b) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 906(b), provides that the compensation rate cannot be more than twice “the applicable national average weekly wage,” as determined for each fiscal year; nor can compensation for total disability be less than the lesser of half the “applicable national average weekly wage” so determined and the worker’s full pre-injury earnings. The question which fiscal year’s limits are the “applicable” ones is addressed by § 6(c):

Determinations under subsection (b)(3) of this section with respect to a [fiscal year]
shall apply to employees or survivors currently receiving compensation for permanent
total disability or death benefits during such period, as well as those newly awarded compensation during such period.

33 U.S.C. § 906(c) (emphasis added). The determinant of the years whose limits are “applicable” under this provision has divided the three courts of appeals that have addressed it. The Court granted certiorari to resolve the question:

Whether the phrase “those newly awarded compensation during such period” in Longshore Act § 6(c) makes the time an award is first entered determinative, or can and should be read to mean “those first entitled to compensation during such period,” regardless of when an award is first entered.

The Merits Reply Brief is here (courtesy of Cockle Law Blog).  I don't have the other merits briefs yet, but will post if I get them.

Earlier posts including the cert petition phase briefs are here and here.