There is an adage: bad facts make bad law. But, there is a corollary that not every wrong has a remedy.
The Fifth Circuit has a new Jones Act case that highlights this corollary. The case is Beech v. Hercules Drilling Company, LLC and it can be found here.
Facts: two oil rig workers. One brings a firearm to the rig (in violation of company policy) and shows it to another worker. The gun inadvertently goes off mortally wounding the worker. Worker's widow brings a Jones Act suit and obtains a judgment at trial.
On appeal, the employer argued that the injury was not in the scope of the firearm owner's employment.
Analysis: as an initial matter, it is crucial to note that the Jones Act is not a worker compensation statute. It is liberally construed in favor of injured workers, but Jones Act liability is rooted in negligence, not strict liability.
So, in this case, the employer is only vicariously liable for its employees, when those employees are acting within the scope of their employment. As the court noted:
One of those common law principles that still carries “great weight” in the FELA and Jones Act context is that an employer may be vicariously liable for its employee’s negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior so long as the negligence occurred “in the course of employment.” See, e.g., Landry v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 731 F.2d 299, 303 (5th Cir. 1984); Sobieski v. Ispat Island, Inc.,
413 F.3d 628, 632 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[V]icarious liability may extend to FELA or Jones Act employers under the traditional doctrine of respondeat superior.So, the question turns on whether the firearm owner was acting in the scope of his employment. On the applicable legal test, the circuits appear to have split. The Seventh Circuit, in Baker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 502 F.2d 638, 641-42 (6th Cir. 1974) adopted a business interests test where an employee could be in the scope of his/her employment when actually in the service of his employer AND doing those things incident to that service.
Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the facts under both tests and found that the firearm owner was not acting in the scope of his employment, nor was his handling of the firearm incidental to his employment.