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Whitesell Revisited - Hawaii Courts Tackle The Neighbor's Tree Issue

Our most viewed post was on the topic of bananas.  Strange fare for a law blog, but yes, there is law on bananas that are on my neighbor's tree but that are on my side of the property line.  Good fences make good neighbors (Mr. Frost may disagree), but free bananas mean banana bread!  

My bananas post discusses the very famous (and short) decision from the brand new Intermediate Court of Appeals in the case of Whitesell v. Houlton.

In Whitesell, the Intermediate Court of Appeals had to opine on the legalities associated with a banyan tree near the property line.  In resolving the case, the court said:

We hold that non-noxious plants ordinarily are not nuisances; that overhanging branches which merely cast shade or drop leaves, flowers, or fruit are not nuisances; that roots which interfere only with other plant life are not nuisances; that overhanging branches or protruding roots constitute a nuisance only when they actually cause, or there is imminent danger of them causing, sensible harm to property other than plant life, in ways other than by casting shade or dropping leaves, flowers, or fruit; that when overhanging branches or protruding roots actually cause, or there is imminent danger of them causing, sensible harm to property other than plant life, in ways other than by casting shade or dropping leaves, flowers, or fruit, the damaged or imminently endangered neighbor may require the owner of the tree to pay for the damages and to cut back the endangering branches or roots and, if such is not done within a reasonable time, the damaged or imminently endangered neighbor may cause the cutback to be done at the tree owner's expense.

However, we also hold that a landowner may always, at his own expense, cut away only to his property line above or below the surface of the ground any part of the adjoining owner's trees or other plant life.

In Whitesell, the ICA did not define what it meant by "noxious", but just last week, the ICA went back to Whitesell to do just that. 

The case is Spittler v. Charbonneau and arises from Kapoho on the Island of Hawaii.  In this case, the boundary between the neighbor's properties was disputed.  One owner had planted several trees on the wrong side of the property line.  The trees were ubiquitous in Hawaii:  the Ironwood, the Loulu Palm and the Coconut Palm. After a tree branch fell and caused property damage, the neighbor relationship failed and litigation ensued.

First, the Ironwood (pictured below):

The complaint led to a counterclaim with claims of trespassing, killing trees, loud music, gunfire and profanities exchanged on the disputed border.  Ultimately, all the claims were settled except for the trespass claim and the nuisance claim.  

Under Whitesell, non-noxious plants were not nuisances, so the appeals court had to decide whether the Ironwood was noxious.  Without a definition, the ICA turned to Old Mr. Webster, the Hawaii Administrative Rules, the Hawaii Pacific Weed Risk Assessment website.  The Ironwood is not listed as a "noxious weed" in the Hawaii Administrative Rules.  But, the failing of the term "noxious" is that it didn't accurately label the problem:  risk to humans.  So, the ICA said:  

Our use of the word "non-noxious" in Whitesell was superfluous. A noxious plant - i.e., one that is "physically harmful or destructive to living beings" - is one that actually causes, or that could pose an imminent danger of causing, material harm to persons or to property other than plant life; conversely, a plant that actually causes, or that poses an imminent danger of causing, material harm to persons or property other than plant life may be considered noxious. We note that certain plants, such as coconut palms, are capable of causing material injury to persons or to property other than plant life just by dropping fronds or nuts. We also note that tree roots can, under some circumstances, pose imminent trip hazards without damaging property other than plant life. We therefore modify our holding in Whitesell for when a plant can be considered a nuisance. Plants whose overhanging branches cast shade or drop leaves, flowers, or fruit, or whose roots interfere only with other plant life, are not nuisances. Overhanging branches or protruding roots constitute a nuisance when they actually cause, or there is imminent danger of them causing, material harm to a person or to property other than plant life. When overhanging branches or protruding roots actually cause, or there is imminent danger of them causing, harm to a person or to property other than plant life, the damaged or imminently endangered neighbor may require the tree's owner to pay for the damage and to cutback the endangering branches or roots and, if that is not done within a reasonable time, the damaged or imminently endangered neighbor may cause the cutback to be done at the tree owner's expense. And as we stated in Whitesell, "a landowner may always, at [their] own expense, cut away only to [their] property line above or below the surface of the ground any part of the adjoining owner's trees or other plant life." 2 Haw. App. at 368, 632 P.2d at 1079.

So, a nuisance (which carries the remedial power of injunction) can flow from an overhanging plant when there is actual harm to body or property or imminent danger of the harm.

So, what to do about that pesky ironwood.

[Photo courtesy of Professor Gerald Carr]

On trespass, the court began with an acknowledgement that no Hawaii appellate court had ever adopted the elements of the tort of trespass, so, after referencing the Restatement, it did so.  Under Hawaii law (now):

Restatement§ 158 states: One is subject to liability to another for trespass, irrespective of whether [they] thereby cause[] harm to any legally protected interest of the other, if [they] intentionally

(a) enter land in the possession of the other, or cause[] a thing or a third person to do so, or

(b) remain on the land, or

(c) fail to remove from the land a thing which [they are] under a duty to remove.

Restatement§ 161 states:

(1) A trespass may be committed by the continued presence on the land of a structure, chattel, or other thing which the actor has tortiously placed there, whether or not the  actor has the ability to remove it.

(2) A trespass may be committed by the continued presence on the land of a structure, chattel, or other thing which the actor's predecessor in legal interest therein has tortiously placed there, if the actor, having acquired [their] legal interest in the thing with knowledge of such tortious conduct or having thereafter learned of it, fails to remove the thing.

Restatement§ 6 (Am. Law Inst. 1965) states:

The word "tortious" is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote the fact that conduct whether of act or omission is of such a character as to subject the actor to liability under the principles of the law of Torts.

Finally, Restatement§ 166 (Am. Law Inst. 1965) states:

Except where the actor is engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity, an unintentional and non-negligent entry on land in the possession of another, or causing a thing or third person to enter the land, does not subject the actor to liability to the possessor, even though the entry causes harm to the possessor or to a thing or third person in whose security the possessor has a legally protected interest.

Applying this law to the facts of this case, the court held:

Accordingly, we hold that a person whose plant, located on the person's property, drops leaves, flowers, or fruit onto neighboring property, or whose plant's roots interfere only with other plant life on neighboring property, is not liable to the neighboring property owner for trespass.

So, leaves, flowers and fruit falling onto your neighbor's property is NOT common law trespass.  If they cause damage to person or property on the way down, the court noted that you could be liable in "tort". 

Hawaii Real Estate Litigation Update - 2016 - Telescopes, Ag Lands and More

My partner Gregory W. Kugle and I were pleased to present at our fourth annual Hawaii State Bar Association Real Property and Financial Services Section Real Estate Litigation Update for 2016. Greg covered the big cases from 2016, including the Thirty Meter Telescope, the Haleakala Telescope, Koa Ridge and Hoopili.  The topics covered and links to opinions and analysis are below.   

 

 

RPFSS Brown Bag - Litigation Update

By Gregory W. Kugle and Mark M. Murakami

November 18, 2016

Topic	Case	Hyperlink
Important Ag Lands	Sierra Club v. D.R. Horton-Schuler Homes	Opinion, Dissent
Important Ag Lands	Sierra Club v. Castle & Cooke Homes Hawaii, Inc.	Opinion, Dissent
Conservation District Permits	Kilakila ‘o Haleakala v. Bd. Of Land & Natural Res.	Opinion, Concurrence, Wilson Dissent, Pollack Dissent, Analysis
Environmental Policy	Kilakila ‘o Haleakala v. Bd. Of Land & Natural Res.	Opinion
Environmental Policy	Umberger v. Dep’t of Land & Natural Res.	ICA Opinion
Condemnation	County of Kauai v. Hanalei River Holdings, Ltd.	ICA Opinion, Analysis
Land Use	Robert D. Ferris Trust v. Planning Comm'n of the County of Kauai	Opinion, Analysis
Admin Law	Ford v. Leithead-Todd	ICA Opinion
Admin Law	Green Party of Hawaii v. Scott Nago	Opinion, Analysis

 

NATIONAL

 

Topic	Case	Hyperlink
Affordable Housing –Inclusionary Zoning	616 Croft Avenue LLC v. City of West Hollywood	Opinion
Planning and Property Rights	Kirby v. North Carolina Department of Transportation	Opinion
Entry Statutes	Property Reserve, Inc. v. Superior Court	Analysis
Highest and Best Use and Jury vs. Judge	City of Perris v. Stemper	Opinion
Regulatory Takings	Murr v. State of Wisconsin	Analysis

NEXT UP

 

Federal and State Preemption - Ninth Circuit GMO Cases

Hawaii Supreme Court - State Retirees Right to Health Benefits Requires Trial

Deviating from our usual fare of ocean and land related cases, we wade into a constitutional thicket and report on Dannenberg v. State of Hawaii.  The opinion from the Supreme Court is here.  

Judge James Dannenberg (retired) is the lead plaintiff in a class action brought on behalf of:

All employees (and their dependent-beneficiaries) who began working for the Territory of Hawai'i, the State of Hawai'i or the political subdivisions thereof, before July 1, 2003, and
who have accrued or will accrue a right to post-retirement health benefits as a retiree or dependent-beneficiary of such a retiree. This includes: (a) those who have not yet
received any post-retirement health benefits from Defendants as a retiree or dependent beneficiary of such a retiree; and (b) those. who have received any post-retirement health
benefits from Defendants since July 1, 2003 as a retiree or dependent-beneficiary of such a retiree. For purposes of damages only, if any, the class shall also include the estates and heirs of any deceased retiree or deceased dependent-beneficiary of a retiree who is or was a member of the class.

So, basically, every retired state or county worker.  [Side note:  Judge Dannenberg was an adjunct professor teaching Evidence to a certain blogger].  At issue was whether the State and Counties have impaired the "accrued retirement health benefits" in violation of article XVI, section 2 of the Hawaii Constitution which provides: 

Membership in any employees' retirement system of the State or any political subdivision thereof shall be a contractual relationship, the accrued benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired.

The class action plaintiffs argued that the State had to maintain parity with current health benefits, lest they impair the benefits of retirees.  The State had changed copays, coverages, deductibles and maximums for the retirees leading to this lawsuit.

The State argued that there was no diminishment of benefits, as a matter of fact.  The case went to the Hawaii Supreme Court by way of summary judgment granted in favor of the State.

The Hawaii Supreme Court (not the usual court, since all justices recused themselves) found that parity with current employees was not the constitutionally required but what the impairment clause protected was "accrued health benefits".  So, a trial was necessary to determine what each employees accrued health benefits actually were:

Instead, we hold that the starting place for a determination of Appellants' accrued health benefits is the retiree health benefits, included in a Health Fund benefits plan,
that were promised to Appellants at the time of their enrollment in the ERS, as these are the benefits that, in the first instance, arise from their membership in the ERS.

Noting that benefits change from time to time, both positively and negatively, the Court stated:

Offsetting advantages and disadvantages must take into account how changes to health benefits impact retirees, as well as the government fisc. See Duncan, 71 P.3d at 891-92. In other words, considering the health benefits included in the health benefits plan offered by the Health Fund as the starting place, the "equivalent value" of accrued retirement health benefits must be viewed from the beneficiaries' viewpoint, and not simply in consideration of the cost to the State. As explained in Duncan, "equivalent value must be proven by a comparison of benefits provided-merely comparing old and new premium costs does not establish equivalency." Duncan, 71 P.3d at 892.

The court remanded the case to circuit court for trial.  Stand by for that one.

Supreme Court - Insular Areas are Not States

Hawaii's position as the 50th State provides an interesting vantage to view the governance of those territorial areas that are within the United States but are not a state.  Since the late 1890's, the United States has been vexed by the metaphysical question:  how do we classify those persons living in geographic areas under the control of the United States. With the U.S. victory in the Spanish American War, the United States became more of a global imperial power as it acquired such far flung territories as  Puerto Rico, the Philippines and Guam. The annexation of Hawaii in 1898 occurred during this time of American expansion.

Our New Possessions by Trumbull White (1898):

After the physical acquisition of the lands, the constitutional and statutory status of the peoples inhabiting these areas had to be addressed.  The Supreme Court addressed those issues in a series of cases beginning with the Insular Cases (posted here).  The shorthand?  The full panoply of Constitutional rights did not protect the residents of the insular areas and Congress had plenary authority to legislate, by statute, the treatment of residents of those areas under U.S. Code.

Consider this month's case involving whether a criminal defendant who was prosecuted by the federal government unconstitutionally faced a second prosecution in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution.  The Supreme Court said that he did.  The case is Puerto Rico v. Valle case (my earlier post here) and the Supreme Court said:

Puerto Rico boasts “a relationship to the United States that has no parallel in our history.” Examining Bd., 426 U. S., at 596. And since the events of the early 1950’s, an integral aspect of that association has been the Commonwealth’s wide-ranging self-rule, exercised under its own Constitution. As a result of that charter, Puerto Rico today can avail itself of a wide variety of futures. But for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the future is not what matters—and there is no getting away from the past. Because the ultimate source of Puerto Rico’s prosecutorial power is the Federal Government—because when we trace that authority all the way back, we arrive at the doorstep of the U. S. Capitol—the Commonwealth and the United States are not separate sovereigns. That means the two governments cannot “twice put” respondents Sánchez Valle and Gómez Vázquez “in jeopardy” for the “same offence.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 5. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. 

Had Puerto Rico been considered a constitutional "state", then the Double Jeopardy Clause would not apply.

So, it is entirely within the discretion of the Congress to determine when the governments of the insular areas would be afforded "statehood" treatment.  Consider the Puerto Rico bond case, Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, In this case, Congress included Puerto Rico in the definition of State in the Bankruptcy Code, but it excluded Puerto Rico as entitled to the protections of Chapter 9 (municipal bankruptcy provisions).  As the Supreme Court said:

The Federal Bankruptcy Code pre-empts state bankruptcy laws that enable insolvent municipalities to restructure their debts over the objections of creditors and instead requires municipalities to restructure such debts under Chapter 9 of the Code. 11 U. S. C. §903(1). We must decide whether Puerto Rico is a “State” for purposes of this pre-emption provision. We hold that it is. The Bankruptcy Code has long included Puerto Rico as a “State,” but in 1984 Congress amended the definition of “State” to exclude Puerto Rico “for the purpose of defining who may be a debtor under chapter 9.” Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act, §421( j)(6), 98 Stat. 368, now codified at 11 U. S. C. §101(52). Puerto Rico interprets this amended definition to mean that Chapter 9 no longer applies to it, so it is no longer a “State” for purposes of Chapter 9’s pre-emption provision. We hold that Congress’ exclusion of Puerto Rico from the definition of a “State” in the amended definition does not sweep so broadly. By excluding Puerto Rico “for the purpose of defining who may be a debtor under chapter 9,” §101(52) (emphasis added), the Code prevents Puerto Rico from authorizing its municipalities to seek Chapter 9 relief. Without that authorization, Puerto Rico’s municipalities cannot qualify as Chapter 9 debtors. §109(c)(2). But Puerto Rico remains a “State” for other purposes related to Chapter 9, including that chapter’s pre-emption provision. That provision bars Puerto Rico from enacting its own municipal bankruptcy scheme to restructure the debt of its insolvent public utilities companies. 

Finally, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Tuaua v. United States case (posted last year here).  This case sought to clarify the status of residents of American Samoa who are not included in the definition of "citizen" under the Immigration and Nationality Act, but are considered "nationals".  As stated by the D. C. Circuit Court of Appeals:

In our constitutional republic, Justice Brandeis observed, the title of citizen is superior to the title of President. Thus, the questions “[w]ho is the citizen[?]” and “what is the meaning of the term?” Aristotle, Politics bk. 3, reprinted in part in READINGS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 55, 61 (Francis W. Coker ed., 1938), are no less than the questions of “who constitutes the sovereign state?” and “what is the meaning of statehood as an association?” We are called upon to resolve one narrow circumstance implicating these weighty inquiries. Appellants are individuals born in the United States territory of American Samoa. Statutorily deemed “non-citizen nationals” at birth, they argue the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause affords them citizenship by dint of birthright. They are opposed not merely by the United States but by the democratically elected government of the American Samoan people. We sympathize with Appellants’ individual plights, apparently more freighted with duty and sacrifice than benefits and privilege, but the Citizenship Clause is textually ambiguous as to whether “in the United States” encompasses America’s unincorporated territories and we hold it “impractical and anomalous,” see Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957), to impose citizenship by judicial fiat—where doing so requires us to override the democratic prerogatives of the American Samoan people themselves. The judgment of the district court is affirmed; the Citizenship Clause does not extend birthright citizenship to those born in American Samoa.

So, the takeway?  The full panoply of Constitutional protections, including the 14th Amendment, flow from statehood. So does the right to have one's vote for President counted in the Electoral College.  Statehood matters.  Absent the sovereignty flowing from statehood, the residents of these areas are left to the statutory whim of Congress, 

Don't get me started on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.  That'll be for another day.  

 

 

Legal Profession in Hawaii - the Numbers

The Hawaii State Bar Association just released its statistics for the Hawaii license renewals for 2016.  It is an interesting snapshot of the legal profession in Hawaii and specifically the demographics of attorneys.  

Did you know that Hawaii has 93 judges?  903 government attorneys?

Hawaii has 4,858 active attorneys and 2,948 inactive attorneys.  With the state's population at 1.42 million, this equates to 3.4 attorneys per 1,000 resident.  But, if you take out judges, government attorneys and in-house counsel, that rate is 2.3 private practice attorneys per 1,000 residents.

On the gender front, of the 3,862 non-judge/non-government attorneys, 1,375 are women, or 35%.  33% of judges are women and 48% of government attorneys are women.

On the age front, over 60% of private practice attorneys are over the age of 50, including 6 who are over 90.

And, attorneys reported providing 186,215 hours of pro bono service to the community.

Attorneys are licensed by the Supreme Court of Hawaii, pictured below.

 

Hawaii Real Estate Litigation Update 2015 - HSBA Real Property and Financial Services Section

Last year, Gregory W. Kugle and I provided our annual Hawaii real estate litigation update for the Hawaii State Bar Association's Real Property and Financial Services Section.  The outline, with links to the cases, is provided below and a video of the presentation is conveniently on YouTube.  So, consider yourself updated on what happened in Hawaii real estate litigation in 2015.

 

 

 

HSBA Real Property and Financial Services Section

Litigation Update – Nov. 20, 2015

12:00 p.m. – 1:00 p.m.

Gregory W. Kugle and Mark M. Murakami

Hawaii

Land Use/Development Litigation – Surfrider Foundation v. Zoning Board of Appeals; Prof. Callies on Kyo-Ya: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x-CQsYX9Wy4.

 

Administrative Appeals – Doe v. Attorney General (Finality requirement for Ch. 91 appeal), more analysis here; Mauna Kea Anaina Hou v. Bd. Of Land and Natural Resources (TMT contested case).

Quiet Title/Foreclosure/Lease Cancellation – Ka‘upulehu Land LLC v. Heirs and Assigns of Pahukula (quiet title);  JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Young (attorney affirmation text); Lui-Dyball v. Hawaiian Homes Comm’n (homestead lease cancellation); Ross v. Wahinehookae (quiet title).

Shoreline – Gold Coast Neighborhood Assn. v. State of Hawaii ;

Condemnation/Regulatory Takings – James v. City and County (HRS Ch. 101 order of possession); Aina Lea.

Fraudulent Transfer -   Schmidt v. HSC, Inc.

Municipal Government/Preemption -  Ruggles v. Yagong. 

National Cases with Potential Impacts in Hawaii

Right to Enter Statutes -  Virginia statute not a facial taking, here; California statute pends with California courts here.

 

San Jose’s Inclusionary zoning ordinance here.

 

Clean Water Act, “Waters of the United States” Rule here.

 

SCOTUS on New Deal Price Controls here.

 

Next year?  Hoopili, Koa Ridge, TMT and more.  Stay tuned.

HSBA Real Property Section - Litigation Update 2014

In preparing for our 2015 presentation, we discovered that the 2014 version wasn't posted to our blog yet.  And, thanks to the HSBA Real Property Section, we even have video! 

Enjoy and stay tuned for video of tomorrow's presentation. Aloha.  

Annual Hawaii Real Estate Litigation Update - HSBA Real Property Section

Full disclosure:  most of my practice involves LAND and not the ocean.  We live on an island after all.

In any event, on Friday, my partner Greg Kugle and I will be providing our annual Real Estate Litigation Update to the HSBA's Real Property and Financial Services Section. This is about our third time providing the update and last year it even made it to youtube  (Materials from last year's talk available here.)  

Details:

• Date: Friday, November 20, 2015 (like tomorrow)
• Time: 12 noon - 1:00 p.m.
• Location: HSBA Conference Room, 1100 Alakea Street, 10th Floor, Honolulu
• Cost: FREE for RPFSS members. 

As a teaser, we will cover Hawaii decisions from the last year involving land use, administrative appeals, quiet title, shoreline, reg takings and condemnation, and preemption. We will also cover decisions from other jurisdictions which have an impact on Hawaii property law practice.

 

Territorial Status Case Headed for Supreme Court

October 1st and the Supreme Court just granted hearing in several cases.  Of note, to this humble island attorney, is the case of Puerto Rico v. Valle. Those pesky Insular Cases....(my posts here and here).

This case arises from a criminal prosecution in Puerto Rico.  A criminal defendant was convicted of federal crimes in federal court, but then subsequently tried and convicted of violations of Puerto Rico law.  He challenged the second conviction on Double Jeopardy grounds.  The Double Jeopardy clause of the U.S. Constitution provides:  Nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.  Amend. V.  This provision does not protect criminal offenders who are charged for the same conduct by different sovereigns.  Consider a bank robber:  bank robbery is a federal crime (18 U.S.C. 2113) and armed robbery is a state crime.  Because a State and the Federal Government are separate sovereigns, no double jeopardy violation.

So, from a Constitutional perspective, is Puerto Rico the same sovereign as the federal government OR, as the Question Presented asks:  Whether the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the Federal Government are separate sovereigns for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution.

Puerto Rico says: No.  It has a Congressionally approved organic act and constitution which gave the people's sovereign power to the Puerto Rico government, which in turn, passed the criminal code.

Mr. Valle says:  Yes.  Under the Constitution, there are only two sovereigns:  states and the federal government and Puerto Rico is not a state.

SCOTUSBLOG has the cert briefs here.  When the merits briefs are available, we will post them here.

This blogger's answer?  Stay tuned.

Ninth Circuit - Jones Act is Constitutional

The Ninth Circuit struck down a challenge to the constitutionality of the Jones Act or Merchant Marine Act of 1920.  The case was Novak v. United States and the opinion can be found here.

The litigated component of the Jones Act (rest easy merchant mariners, you didn't lose your worker compensation causes of action) was the requirement that any ship carrying cargo between two points in the United States - say Long Beach and Honolulu - be "built in the United States."  

Per the Court:

Plaintiffs’ theory is that, by excluding foreign competition, the cabotage provisions have created “an essentially monopolistic Hawaiian ocean shipping market” that has resulted in “high prices” and “a de facto duopoly” of two established firms in the Hawaii-mainland shipping market. Plaintiffs contend that all Hawaii residents and businesses, including themselves, have been harmed not only by the increased shipping costs, but also by the resultant inflated cost of doing business in Hawaii because higher shipping costs lead to higher prices for imported goods. Plaintiffs assert that interstate trade between Hawaii and the rest of the United States has been significantly stifled to such an extent that the effect of the Jones Act’s restrictions amounts to “an unlawful restraint of trade and interstate commerce, thereby violating the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.” Plaintiffs filed this action against the United States, asserting a single cause of action under the Commerce Clause.

The basic issue on appeal is the Standing doctrine which requires you to be the right plaintiff with an injury caused by some conduct and that injury can be redressed by a favorable decision.

The Ninth Circuit rejected this challenge to the Jones Act because the harm alleged by plaintiffs - increased prices for goods purchased in Hawaii - was not caused by the Jones Act itself, but was rather based on the prices set by the shipping companies carrying the cargo.  As such, absent showing that BUT FOR the Jones Act, the prices would have assuredly been less, the Plaintiffs did not have standing to bring the challenge.

Classically, amendment of a complaint could cure a standing problem, so the Ninth Circuit analyzed whether amendment could cure the problem.  Under the federal rules, amendment of complaints should be allowed, unless it would be futile.  Or, if the amended complaint would fail for any reason, the court won't allow you to amend it.

In this case, the Ninth Circuit found the Jones Act to be a valid exercise of Congress' commerce clause powers.